University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM—FOR WHOSE BENEFIT
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS? PERSPECTIVES ON
SHAREHOLDER AND STAKEHOLDER PRIMACY

Article 14

1-1-2021

The (Im)Permanent Apportionment Act: Unequal Congressional
Representation and Apportionment Reform
Quentin Barbosa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Quentin Barbosa, The (Im)Permanent Apportionment Act: Unequal Congressional Representation and
Apportionment Reform, 53 U. PAC. L. REV. 239 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol53/iss1/14

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

The (Im)Permanent Apportionment Act: Unequal
Congressional Representation and Apportionment Reform
Quentin Barbosa*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 240
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 242
A. The Founders’ Intent for House Membership and Later Changes
to the Constitution ............................................................................243
B. The 435-Member Cap in House of Representatives ............................246
C. The Huntington–Hill Apportionment Method .....................................246
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE CASELAW.............................. 248
IV. WHY THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES AN EXPANDED HOUSE AND THE
INADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS .......................................... 252
A. How the 435-Representative Cap Violates the Constitution ...............252
B. Alternatives to Expanding the House ..................................................255
1. Changing the Apportionment Method ......................................... 256
2. Making the House of Representatives Smaller ............................ 256
3. Allowing Districts to Cross State Lines ....................................... 257
V. SOLUTIONS TO EXPAND THE HOUSE ............................................................. 259
A. The Wyoming Rule ...........................................................................259
B. The Cube Root Rule..........................................................................260
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED HOUSE ....................................... 261
A. Criticism of an Expanded House.........................................................262
B. Benefits of an Expanded House...........................................................264
VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 266

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2022; B.A. Political
Science, California Polytechnic State University, Sean Luis Obispo, 2019. I cannot express enough thanks to my
faculty advisor—the incredible Dean Mary-Beth Moylan—for her guidance, expertise, edits, support, and
mentorship, which immeasurably benefited this Comment. Many thanks to the Law Review staff and the Board
of Editors for their diligent efforts. Special thanks to Thomas Gerhart and Lauren Hirota for whipping this
Comment into shape and pushing me to make it the best it could be. Thanks to my family and friends for their
support and encouragement. And in particular, I’d like to thank my darling Ivy Kolb for her unwavering love and
support, keeping me humble, and making me feel like I am living the dream.

239

2021 / Unequal Congressional Representation and Apportionment Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
For a nation that considers itself the exemplary representative democracy, the
United States House of Representatives’ structure is disgraceful.1 The stagnation
in House membership is a main reason the House—the only federal majoritarian
democratic institution—is failing to check executive power and accurately
represent Americans.2 The Constitution requires that each state have a minimum
of one representative and that Congress apportion the remaining representatives to
the states based on population.3 Yet, representation in the House—and the
Electoral College—is unequal due to an outdated, century-old cap on the number
of representatives.4 Despite population growth, the House reapportions the same
number of seats each decade.5
The current reapportionment regime makes a half-hearted attempt to factor in
population growth but results in jarringly uneven representation.6 For example,
Montana has roughly 1,000,000 residents while Wyoming has roughly 570,000
residents, yet both states have one representative.7 Because of this inequality in
1. Daniel Greenburg, Why 435? How We Can Change the Size of the House of Representatives, FAIR VOTE
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.fairvote.org/how_we_can_change_the_size_of_the_house_of_representatives (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Chris Wilson, How to Fix the House of Representatives in
One Easy, Radical Step, TIME (Oct. 15, 2018), https://time.com/5423623/house-representatives-number-seats/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups,
and
Average
Citizens,
12
PERSP.
ON
POL.
564,
569
(Sept.
2014),
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding
that the preferences in law or policy in Congress of the top 10% of earners routinely defeated those of average
Americans); see also Israel Klein, To Make the House of Representatives Work Again, Make It Bigger, HILL (Aug.
17, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/402234-to-make-the-house-of-representatives-work-againmake-it-bigger (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that underrepresentation can kill
democracies and that each member will represent districts of at least 1,000,000 by 2050, so the House should be
expanded to ensure adequate representation of constituents and accountability of members); Boxer Orwell,
Unrepresentative Government: No, Our Elected Oligarchy in Congress Doesn’t Represent Your Interests,
MEDIUM (Oct. 18, 2019), https://boxerorwell.medium.com/unrepresentative-government-no-our-electedoligarchy-in-congress-doesnt-really-represent-your-b4b2794f5dc3 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. See Editorial Board, America Needs a Bigger House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/09/opinion/expanded-house-representatives-size.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that a state’s proportion of electoral college votes is equal
to the state’s number of representatives plus the number of senators).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
6. CAROLINE KANE ET AL., FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, WHY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MUST
BE EXPANDED AND HOW TODAY’S CONGRESS CAN MAKE IT HAPPEN 3, 8 (2020),
https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/14402/Why the House Must Be Expanded Democracy
Clinic.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Editorial Board, supra note 4.
7. Greenburg, supra note 1; Editorial Board, supra note 4; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE POPULATION
TOTALS AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 2010–2019 (2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review); Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, United States House of Representatives Seats by State, ENCYC.
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constituents per representative, a Wyomingite has nearly twice the representation
in the House as a Montanan.8 Rhode Island has roughly 1,000,000 residents, but
two House seats—half as many constituents per representative as Montana.9 Large
states also suffer; California’s population outnumbers Wyoming’s 66-to-1, but
California’s share of representatives compared to Wyoming’s is 53-to-1.10 These
inequalities violate the fundamental democratic principle of “one person, one
vote.”11 There is no reason to distinguish interstate district malapportionment from
intrastate district malapportionment.12
These examples illustrate that states receive the mathematically correct
number of seats, yet the 435-member cap under- or over-represents low population
states by unequally distributing constituents per representative.13 The best solution
to these unconstitutional disparities is to expand the House of Representatives to
reflect state population growth.14 Reforming the House to be a more effective
majoritarian institution will help repair other crumbling democratic institutions.15
Furthermore, the representative cap has no constitutional basis; therefore, it is
subject to the one person, one vote constitutional requirement and Congress can

BRITANNICA (updated June 7, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-House-of-RepresentativesSeats-by-State-1787120 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7; Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 7.
9. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7; Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 7.
10. Jeffery W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and
Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2011).
11. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9, 18 (1964) (finding that state laws that unequally distribute
constituents in House districts to make a vote worth more in one district than in another are unconstitutional under
Article I, § 2).
12. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 461 (1992) (“There is some force that the
same historical insights that informed our construction of Article I, § 2, in the context of intrastate districting
should apply here as well.”); see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7 (“A single Congressman represents from two to
three times as many Fifth District voters as are represented . . . [in] other Georgia congressional districts. The
apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some voters and expands that of others. If the Federal
Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as
any other vote, then this statute cannot stand.”); Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1156.
13. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1130, 1134.
14. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727–28 (1983) (holding a 1980 New Jersey redistricting
plan unconstitutional where New Jersey’s Fourth and Sixth districts had a difference in population of .6984% of
the average district); see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793–97 (1973) (finding a Texas redistricting plan
unconstitutional and required immediate reform because there was a difference in population among districts of
4.13%); Greenburg, supra note 1; Editorial Board, supra note 4; Chris Wilson, How to Fix the House of
Representatives in One Easy, Radical Step, TIME (Oct. 15, 2018), https://time.com/5423623/houserepresentatives-number-seats/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
15.
See
Democracy
Index
2019,
ECONOMIST
INTEL.
UNIT,
40
(2020),
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(ranking the United States as a flawed democracy due to a decline in the functioning of government and public
trust in basic democratic institutions); see also The Federalist Society, Should We Change the Size of Congress?
[Article
I
Initiative],
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kh1pgfj5LoM&ab_channel=TheFederalistSociety (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how more members in the House could ensure adequate
oversight of the federal government and better represent constituents in smaller population districts).
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replace it by statute.16 Instead of diluting voting power and representation,
Congress should adopt the Cube Root Rule as an additional automatic formula to
manageably expand the House and promote equal representation.17
Part II of this Comment provides background on the Founders’ intent,
constitutional language, 435-member cap, and seat apportionment method.18 Part
III details the development of one person, one vote caselaw.19 Part IV analyzes the
435-member cap’s constitutionality, the need for an expanded House, and
alternative solutions.20 Part V explains how to expand the House.21 Part VI explains
the policy implications of an expanded House.22
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Apportioning representatives based on state population originates in the
Constitution.23 However, the Founders had comparatively different ideas for
apportionment than today’s method.24 Section A examines the Constitution and the
Founders’ intent.25 Section B discusses the 435-seat cap’s history.26 Section C
explains the Huntington–Hill Apportionment Method: the current method for
granting House seats.27

16. Wilson, supra note 1.
17. See Greenburg, supra note 1 (explaining that the Cube Root Rule involves taking the cube root of
national population after each census and subtracting the number of senators to determine how many
representatives should be in the House of Representatives for that decade); Editorial Board, supra note 4; Oliver
Staley & Nikhil Sonnad, What Would Happen to the Electoral College if Congressional Districts Were
Apportioned Evenly?, QUARTZ (Dec. 19, 2016), https://qz.com/865380/to-fix-the-electoral-college-increase-thesize-of-the-house-of-representatives/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. Infra Part II.
19. Infra Part III.
20. Infra Part IV.
21. Infra Part V.
22. Infra Part VI.
23.
See
Proportional
Representation,
OFF.
OF
THE
HOUSE
HISTORIAN,
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Proportional-Representation/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the foundations for the proportional
representation system in the House of Representatives).
24. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, 58 (James Madison); Legislative History of Article the First of the Federal
Bill
of
Rights,
THIRTY THOUSAND.ORG
(updated
June
28,
2007),
http://www.thirtythousand.org/pages/A1LegHistory.htm (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Methods of
Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/methods
_of_apportionment.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the mathematically
complex method the Census Bureau uses to allocate House seats to states based on population within the 435seat cap).
25. Infra Section II.A.
26. Infra Section II.B.
27. Infra Section II.C.
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A. The Founders’ Intent for House Membership and Later Changes to the
Constitution
One of the main issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the level
of representation in Congress for both the small and large population states.28
Small states advocated for equal representation because they believed proportional
representation in Congress would cause large states to bury their interests.29
Conversely, large states advocated for proportional representation because they
believed equal representation in Congress would amplify small states’ power and
reduce large states’ power.30 The solution was the Great Compromise, which
created a bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.31 House membership is based on proportional representation; the Senate
has equal representation regardless of population.32 Without this compromise, the
Convention might have dissolved without the states ratifying the Constitution.33
The Constitution requires Congress to reapportion seats in the House every ten
years based on the census.34 After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment
refined the Constitution, providing, “[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers.”35 In doing so, the
Constitution expressly requires proportional representation among the states,
rather than within the states.36
The Constitution requires each district have one representative and no less than
30,000 people; however, each state must have at least one representative,
regardless of its population size.37 But since Congress must allocate additional
seats based on population, it follows that representation in the House should be
proportional with most states having more than one seat.38 Meanwhile, the
Constitution imposes no cap on seats.39

28.
29.
30.
31.

OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1140–41 (citing WALTER B. MEAD, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
PERSONALITIES, PRINCIPLES, AND ISSUES 71 (1987)); OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
32. OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
35. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
(“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
38. See id. (explaining that there are more seats to apportion based on state population, which leads to the
rational conclusion that the Constitution implies that states will have more than one seat in an even ratio to other
states if their proportion of the population passes a certain threshold).
39. Id.
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The Constitution does not command a maximum number of constituents per
representative, but the Founders seemingly believed 30,000 was ideal.40 During
the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the only time George Washington expressed
an opinion was when he suggested making the minimum constituency size 30,000
people rather than 40,000 people.41 At the convention, Anti-Federalists claimed
the size of the House was too small to adequately represent the people or protect
them from congressional abuses of power.42 In response, James Madison explained
the size of the House was a delicate balance between the ability to legislate and
keeping legislators in touch with their constituents.43
First, Madison noted that the size of the House will grow as more states joined
the Union because of population increases.44 Similarly, he dismissed complaints
that the number of members in the House will not change “as the progress of
population may demand.”45 Madison argued the House will slowly grow by
pointing to the Constitution’s requirement that “[t]he Number of Representatives

40. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison) (explaining that the House would grow as the
population of states grew).
41. See Jonah Goldberg, George Will Called Me an Idiot, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 15, 2001),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2001/01/george-will-called-me-idiot-jonah-goldberg/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how the only time George Washington interrupted the
Constitutional Convention on a substantive point was to suggest a lower minimum constituency of 30,000 persons
to avoid districts being too large for adequate communication between representatives and constituents about
local interests).
42.
THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST
NO.
55–58
(Federal
Farmer)
http://resources.utulsa.edu/law/classes/rice/Constitutional/AntiFederalist/antifed.htm (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Constitution did not guarantee small constituencies in the House, even as
population grew over time, which Anti-Federalists believed would result in massive constituencies and create a
House comprised of demagogues and the elite—who could only win in such broad constituencies through access
obtained via their wealth or appealing to the desires and prejudices of people—that was out of touch from the
interests of the common, rational constituent). To some degree, the concerns of Anti-Federalists have
materialized: the average number of constituents per member is currently 747,184. Drew Desilver, U.S.
Population Keeps Growing, but House of Representatives is Same Size as in Taft Era, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 31,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/31/u-s-population-keeps-growing-but-house-of-represen
atives-is-same-size-as-in-taft-era/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). There are also examples
of demagogues and the elite winning elections to the House. In 2018, nearly half of the House had a net worth of
over $1,000,000. Net Worth - 2018, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/personal-finances/top-networth (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). In 2020, two far-right
QAnon conspiracy theorists—Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia and Lauren Boebert of Colorado—bashed the
“deep state” to win election to the House. Katherine Tully-McManus, QAnon Goes to Washington: Two
Supporters Win Seats in Congress, ROLL CALL (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/11/05/qanon-goesto-washington-two-supporters-win-seats-in-congress/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
Greene and Boebert both objected to the election results in favor of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., claiming
widespread voter fraud without evidence. Karen Yourish, Larry Buchanan & Denise Lu, The 147 Republicans
Who
Voted
to
Overturn
Election
Results,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
7,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/07/us/elections/electoral-college-biden-objectors.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison) (noting the House must be “of the people,” tracking
their interests and growing parallel to the population).
44. Id.
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).
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shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand.”46 However, Madison warned that
too large of a House would perpetuate oligarchic tendencies and reduce legislative
efficiency as well as the power of representatives.47 He voiced the need for
representatives to directly communicate with their constituents while also diluting
the power of other representatives.48 Madison justified the House’s size by pointing
to the system of checks and balances that prevents one branch from gaining too
much power.49
To assuage Anti-Federalists’ fears, James Madison proposed a package of
constitutional amendments in the First Congress that would become the Bill of
Rights.50 One of these proposed amendments pertained to congressional
apportionment, addressing the House’s allegedly inadequate size to check federal
power and prevent minority rule.51 The states failed to ratify the apportionment
amendment, which clarified that House districts can have no more than 30,000
constituents until there were 200 representatives.52 Once the House had 200
representatives, districts could have no more than 50,000 constituents.53 The
apportionment amendment would have created an unworkable, 6,500-member

46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).
48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison):
[F]irst, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests;
secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous
constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least
with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the
few on the depression of the many. . . . The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to
be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy
a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within
a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
Id.
49. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (implying that the membership of the House will grow due to seat
apportionment based on population of states), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (explaining that membership of the
Senate is fixed with two Senators per state); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison) (noting that equal
representation in the Senate served as a check on potential “mob rule” in the House and provided more power to
smaller population states).
50.
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X; Observing Constitution Day, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Dylan Matthews, The Case for Massively Expanding the House
of Representatives, in One Chart, VOX (June 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/4/17417452/congressrepresentation-ratio-district-size-chart-graph (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
51. Bill of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/bor# (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review); Dylan Matthews, The Case for Massively Expanding the House of
Representatives, in One Chart, VOX (June 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/4/17417452/congressrepresentation-ratio-district-size-chart-graph (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
52. Legislative History of Article the First of the Federal Bill of Rights, THIRTY THOUSAND.ORG (updated
June 28, 2007), http://www.thirty-thousand.org/pages/A1LegHistory.htm (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
53. Id.
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House today, but its existence indicates the Founders’ intention for the House to
accurately and proportionately represent the people.54
B. The 435-Member Cap in House of Representatives
The Constitution provides no mechanism for congressional apportionment or
the number of House seats.55 During the 1920s, the House failed to reapportion
itself for the first time.56 In 1929, Congress passed the Reapportionment Act (“the
Act”), which capped the number of House seats at 435—the number of seats since
1913.57 Membership in the House has since remained at 435 seats, except for a
temporary increase when Alaska and Hawaii became states.58 Congress passed the
cap partly out of concern for the House’s size but mostly to avoid decennial urban–
rural reapportionment conflicts that plagued Congress for 120 years.59
Nevertheless, opponents cast doubt on the cap’s constitutionality.60
C. The Huntington–Hill Apportionment Method
In addition to the 435-member cap, the Act also featured an automatic
apportionment method after each census to avoid bitter apportionment battles in

54. Lyman Stone, Pack the House: How to Fix the Legislative Branch, MERE ORTHODOXY (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://mereorthodoxy.com/congressional-apportionment-amendment/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
56. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1147 (2011) (quoting CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED:
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN–RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S 116 (1990), and BRIAN
FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS: THE CASE FOR INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES 25–26 (2010)).
57. Reapportionment Act of 1929 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2020)); The 1911 House
Reapportionment, OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/19011950/The-1911-House-reapportionment/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review); OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
58. Congress granted Alaska and Hawaii one representative each from 1959 until the 1960 apportionment
entered effect in 1963, when the number of seats returned from 437 to 435. OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra
note 57. There are also six non-voting delegates in the House, representing the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. United States Congressional
Non-Voting Members, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_congressional_non-voting_members
(last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
59. OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 57; OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
60. See OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23 (quoting Representative William B. Bankhead of
Alabama, who exclaimed the cap was an “abdication and surrender of the vital fundamental powers vested in the
Congress of the United States by the Constitution itself.”); see also OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note
57 (quoting Representative Edgar Crumpacker of Indiana during debates on the 1911 Apportionment Act,
“Members are . . . supposed to reflect the opinion and to stand for the wishes of their constituents. If we make the
ratio [of persons per Representative] too large the idea of representation becomes attenuated and less definite.
The personal interest of the voter in his representative becomes less important to him, and we may lose something
of the vital strength of our representative form of government.”).
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the House.61 The House could decide between the method of “major fractions” or
the method of “equal proportions” (“Huntington–Hill method”) for future
reapportionments.62 After the 1940 Census, Congress passed a law that made the
Huntington–Hill method automatically govern all future congressional
reapportionments within the 435-seat cap.63
Under the Huntington–Hill method, the United States Census Bureau (“Census
Bureau”) finds a common divisor by dividing the national population by the
number of seats.64 If a country’s population was 10,000 and it had 20 seats, the
common divisor would be 500.65 Next, the Census Bureau divides each state’s
population by the common divisor to calculate quotients for how many seats each
state should have.66 If there are four states, A with 3,300 residents, B with 3,210
residents, C with 2,500 residents, and D with 990, their quotients would be A = 6.6,
B = 6.42, C = 5, D = 1.98.67 Next, round at each quotients’ “geometric mean”—
the square root of the product of n (n + 1), where n is the lower of the two nearest
whole numbers to a given quotient.68 The higher of the two nearest whole numbers

61. Reapportionment Act of 1929 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2020)); see OFF. OF THE HOUSE
HISTORIAN, supra note 23 (quoting Majority Leader John Q. Tilson of Connecticut who felt the Act would prevent
the “danger of failing to reapportion after each decennial census as contemplated by the Constitution.”).
62. See Reapportionment Act of 1929 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2020)) (stating that Congress
could choose the method of “major fractions” or “equal proportions” for the 1930 apportionment); MICHEL L.
BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 57 (2d
ed. 2001).
63. Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, § 1, 55 Stat. 761 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2020)). The
House used other methods in the past: the Jefferson method (1792–1842), Hamilton method (1850–1900), and
Webster method (“major fractions”) (1840–1850, 1910–1920, 1930–1940). It also considered the Adams and
Dean methods. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 62, at 58–59; Apportionment Legislation 1790–1830, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/apportionment_legislation_
1790_-_1830.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review);
Apportionment Legislation 1840–1880, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/
apportionment/apportionment_legislation_1840_-_1880.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review); Apportionment Legislation 1890-Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/ apportionment_legislation_1890_-_present
.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). The Webster method
was a compromise between the Jefferson method and the Adams method—biased to large and small states
respectively. The Hamilton method suffered from a paradox: adding seats decreased some states’ share in
representation, so the House returned to the Webster method. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 62, at 33–35, 38;
Apportionment Legislation 1890–Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
reference/apportionment/apportionment_legislation_1890_-_present.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
64. Methods of Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/
apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
65. H. PEYTON YOUNG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FAIRNESS IN APPORTIONMENT 15–16 (2004),
https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/Fairness_in_Apportionment_Young.pdf (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
66. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
67. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
68. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
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to a given quotient is (n + 1).69 So A’s geometric mean would be √ (6 x 7) = 6.48,
B’s geometric mean would be √(6 x 7) = 6.48, C’s geometric mean would be √(5
x 6) = 5.48, D’s geometric mean would be √(1 x 2) = 1.41.70 If a state’s quotient
is larger than its geometric mean, the Census Bureau allocates seats equal to the (n
+ 1) value.71 If the state’s quotient is smaller than its geometric mean, the Census
Bureau allocates seats equal to the n value.72 So, A would receive 7 seats, B would
receive 6, C would receive 5, and D would receive 2.73 If the total of those seat
allocations apportions less than the pre-determined total number of seats, the
Census Bureau must reduce the divisor and recalculate.74 If that total apportions
more than the total number of seats, the next step is to increase the divisor and
recalculate.75 The Census Bureau repeats this process until it reaches the total
number of seats.76 In the example, there is no need to modify the divisor and
recalculate: 7 + 6 + 5 + 2 = 20, the pre-determined total number of seats.77
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE CASELAW
The Supreme Court has decided several cases on intrastate congressional
malapportionment.78 The first intrastate malapportionment case was Baker v. Carr,
in which the Court held apportionment is justiciable and not a political question. 79
Although the Court remanded the Baker case to the lower court, it decided Gray v.
Sanders—a congressional apportionment case—a year later on substantive
grounds.80 The plaintiffs in Gray alleged that Georgia violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by granting counties points in primaries for
statewide elections.81 Georgia based those points roughly—but not exactly—on
county populations.82 Instead of using total votes, Georgia used total county points
to decide the election winner.83
69. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
70. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
71. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
72. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
73. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
74. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 16.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. YOUNG, supra note 65, at 15–16 (2004); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64.
78. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
79. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 199, 208 (holding that courts have power to order reconfiguration of districts to
ensure equal protection even when voting power is unequal due to district population discrepancies, stating “A
citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right
secured by the Constitution, when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, or by a refusal to count
votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, or by a stuffing of the ballot box.”) (citations omitted).
80. Gray, 372 U.S. at 380; Baker, 369 U.S. at 199.
81. Gray, 372 U.S. at 370.
82. Id. at 372.
83. Id.
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The Court held the county-based system gave small-rural votes more weight
than urban and large-rural votes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.84 It
reasoned the weighted point allocations gave a person in one county “10 times the
voting power of another person.”85 Analogizing to amendments that bar denying
the right to vote based on race or sex, the Court noted Georgia’s system devalued
voting rights for specific, targeted groups.86 The Court stated that the Constitution
ensures voter equality and states must weigh votes equally.87 Accordingly, the
Court concluded the county system unconstitutionally targeted urban and large
rural voters by diluting their voting power.88
The Court advanced the one person, one vote requirement in Wesberry v.
Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims.89 In Wesberry, voters brought a lawsuit against
Georgia for failing to evenly realign U.S. House districts.90 Plaintiffs’ district had
823,680 constituents; other districts had as little as 272,154 constituents.91 The
Court held that those levels of malapportionment “grossly discriminate[d]” against
the voters of the plaintiffs’ district and were unconstitutional.92 The Court stated
84. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
[T]he county unit system . . . weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weights
some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties. . . . Once the geographical unit for
which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an
equal vote—whatever their race, [sex, occupation, or income], and wherever their home may be in
that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
85. Id.
86. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or abridging a Negro’s right to vote. The
Nineteenth Amendment does the same for women. If a State in a statewide election weighted the male
vote more heavily than the female vote or the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote, none could
successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable. How then can one person be given twice
or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a
rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?
Id. (citations omitted).
87. See id. at 380 (1963) (“The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred
class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to
every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies
many of our decisions.”).
88. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 380–81.
The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right “to cast their
ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections.” Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once. It
must be correctly counted and reported. . . . “the right to have one’s vote counted” has the same dignity as “the
right to put a ballot in a box.” It can be protected from the diluting effect of illegal ballots. . . . [T]here is no
indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between
qualified voters within the State. . . . The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing—one person, one vote.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
90. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2, 7.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 7.
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that Georgia’s malapportionment diluted the power of some votes and amplified
others.93 Citing to The Federalist, the Court noted the Founders intended for
equality in voting power.94 Although exact equality of population in each district
is virtually impossible, the Court held impossibility is “no excuse” for sidestepping
the Constitution’s requirement of voter equality.95
In Reynolds, plaintiffs challenged Alabama’s malapportionment of state
legislative districts—which had been the same for over sixty years—under the
Equal Protection Clause.96 The Court held Alabama’s malapportionment was
unconstitutional because the state failed to make good-faith efforts to make
districts “as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”97 According to the Court,
mathematical exactness was not the constitutional requirement.98 However, the
Court indicated that severe inequalities in district populations are unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause because they dilute voting power based on
“place of residence.”99
93. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–9, 18.
[T]he command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States”
means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another’s. . . . We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit . . . votediluting discrimination . . . through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of
inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter
to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of
Representatives elected “by the People,” a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the
Constitutional Convention. . . . The history of the Constitution . . . reveals that those who framed the
Constitution meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts,
it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.
Id.
94. See id. at 18 (quoting Madison in THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, “‘Who are to be the electors of the Federal
Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs
of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be
the great body of the people of the United States.’ Readers surely could have fairly taken this to mean, ‘one
person, one vote.’”) (citing Gray, 372 U.S. at 381).
95. See id. (“While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that
is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of
people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives. That is the high standard of justice and common
sense which the Founders set for us.”).
96. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540. The distribution of the Alabama state districts was severely unequitable.
For example, two Alabama counties with populations of 13,462 and 15,286 each received two seats. Meanwhile,
two counties with populations of 314,301 and 634,864 received three seats and seven seats respectively. Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 545–46.
97. Id. at 577.
98. Id.
99. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566–67.
[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters . . . .
Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much less
a citizen. The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or
diluting the efficacy of his vote. The complexions of societies and civilizations change, often with
amazing rapidity. A nation once primarily rural in character becomes predominantly urban.
Representation schemes once fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the basic principle
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Since Wesberry and Reynolds, the Court has decided several cases on House
district apportionment within states.100 In each instance, the Court has found the
population discrepancies among districts unconstitutional.101 However, those cases
involve intrastate district malapportionment as opposed to interstate district
malapportionment—an issue the Court has not yet decided.102 In U.S. Department
of Commerce v. Montana, the Court held that congressional apportionment among
the states—including interstate malapportionment—is justiciable.103 However, the
Court did not decide the interstate malapportionment issue despite noting that one
person, one vote cases may apply to interstate malapportionment.104 Rather, the
Court focused on the issue Montana voters raised: whether a different federal
apportionment method other than Huntington–Hill better reflects the constitutional
requirements of Wesberry.105 Instead of focusing on discrepancies in district sizes
from the seat cap, the Court focused on how the apportionment method affects seat
allocation.106 The Court held that Huntington–Hill is a practicable, good-faith
option to fairly apportion seats among states to avoid conflict and promote
efficiency.107 Ultimately, the Court has not decided the interstate

of representative government remains, and must remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s vote
cannot be made to depend on where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point for
consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.
Id.
100. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28; White, 412 U.S. at 784; Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 543 (1969);
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28, 730 (finding that New Jersey district malapportionment levels
were unconstitutional because they failed to be as equal “as nearly as practicable,” even with the plan only
implementing a deviation of 0.6984% from the average district and a 0.1384% difference in the state’s ideal
district size); White, 412 U.S. at 785, 790 (holding that a Texas apportionment plan implementing a deviation of
4.13% from the average district size and a 0.75% difference in the state’s ideal district size were unconstitutional
because they “were not ‘unavoidable,’ and the districts were not as mathematically equal as possible.”); Wells,
394 U.S. at 543, 546 (explaining that New York’s district region-based apportionment plan was unconstitutional,
“[e]quality of population among districts in a sub-state is not a justification for inequality among all the districts
in the State . . . . Nor are the variations in the ‘North country’ districts justified by the fact that these districts are
constructed of entire counties.”); Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 528–30 (finding Missouri’s House seat apportionment
plan “did not meet the constitutional standard of equal representation for equal numbers of people ‘as nearly as
practicable.’”).
102. But see U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 461 (stating that the Court’s interpretation
of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution “in the context of intrastate districting” may apply to interstate
malapportionment); Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1140.
103. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 458 (“As our previous rejection of the political
question doctrine in this context should make clear, the interpretation of the apportionment provisions of the
Constitution is well within the competence of the Judiciary.”).
104. Id. at 461.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 461–63.
107. See id. at 465 (“[A] procedure that is administered efficiently and that avoids partisan controversy
supports the legitimacy of congressional action, rather than undermining it. To the extent that the potentially
divisive and complex issues associated with apportionment can be narrowed by the adoption of both procedural
and substantive rules that are consistently applied year after year, the public is well served . . . . We see no
constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from adopting such a sensible procedure.”).
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malapportionment issue, so some states continue to have inadequate representation
in the House relative to population.108
IV. WHY THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES AN EXPANDED HOUSE AND THE
INADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The 435-member cap—while perhaps well intentioned—creates an
unconstitutional disparity among constituencies.109 Supreme Court precedent
dictates that district populations must be as equal as practicable, yet some districts
in the country are incredibly unbalanced in terms of constituents per
representative.110 Section A discusses how the 435-member cap violates the
Constitution under one person, one vote precedent.111 Section B explains why
alternative solutions to the representation issue—other than expanding the number
of House seats—are ineffective or provide their own host of issues.112
A. How the 435-Representative Cap Violates the Constitution
Proponents of the current representative cap argue it is imperative to promote
legislative efficiency and other practical concerns.113 Even if that were true, that
standard is irrelevant to the cap’s constitutionality; the focus is whether
representatives are “apportioned among the states according to their respective
numbers.”114 Not only must Congress apportion representatives respective to state
populations, the Constitution also requires congressional districts to be equal “as
is practicable” to ensure “equal representation.”115 The Constitution demands this
standard; popular government can only succeed if representatives are accessible to

108. See Clemons v. Dep’t of Commerce, 562 U.S. 1105, 1105 (2010) (dismissing a challenge against
interstate malapportionment for lack of jurisdiction). But see Clemons v. Dep’t of Commerce, 710 F. Supp. 2d
570, 588–90 (N.D. Miss., 2010) (finding that the Constitution did not require an increase in the number of seats
in the House because Congress has discretion to set its own size after balancing competing interests).
109. Cf. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7 (finding that a Georgia statute “grossly discriminate[d]” against voters in
a district that had two to three times as many voters as other districts); Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1142.
110. Cf. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.”); Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1129–31.
111. Infra Section IV.A.
112. Infra Section IV.B.
113. See, e.g., Apportionment of Representatives: Hearing on H.R. 130 Before the H. Comm. on the
Census, 70th Cong. 32–47 (1928) (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.) (advocating for reducing
and capping the size of the House to 300 seats after the 1940 Census because it would be more efficient, allow
each member to be heard during debate, and permit each representative to adequately focus their attention on each
piece of legislation).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Apportionment of Representatives in Congress Amongst the Several States:
Hearing on H.R. 13471 Before the H. Comm. on the Census, 69th Cong. 120–23 (1927) (statement of Hon. Elbert
S. Brigham, Rep. from Vt., H.R.) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 13471].
115. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
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their constituents.116 This standard is clear in both the Constitution’s language and
the Founders’ intent for an evolving and growing House.117 Recent population
growth has made clear that districts are not as equal “as is practicable,” violating
the one person, one vote constitutional requirement.118
The Huntington–Hill method’s goal is to make a good-faith effort to fairly
redistribute House seats based on state populations, partly satisfying the
constitutional requirement.119 But unlike the Montana case, the constitutional
claim here is not about which states receive a seat, but the effects of the
representative cap on interstate malapportionment.120 Because of other
apportionment requirements and uneven population growth between states, the
representative cap exacerbates district malapportionment among states.121 These
challenges make Huntington–Hill inadequate on its own to comply with the
Constitution, even if it is a good-faith attempt to apportion seats as equal as
practicable.122
While there is a population-based system to apportion seats within the 435seat cap, there is not a perfect distribution of constituents per district.123 Exact
equality is mathematically impossible under the seat cap and other apportionment
requirements: urban states will always have substantially higher populations than
rural states.124 Requiring one representative per state ensures districts in smaller
states have more representation than in larger states, while capping the number of
seats amplifies the issue.125 But the seat cap is not in the Constitution, making it
subject to the one person, one vote constitutional requirement.126
Capping the number of representatives, while these other limitations are in
place, is the exact opposite of the government’s good-faith attempt at equality.127

116. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, 58 (James Madison) (explaining the importance of the representatives
in the House being sympathetic to the needs of the people); Hearing on H.R. 13471, supra note 114, at 121–22
(statement of Hon. Elbert S. Brigham, Rep. from Vt., H.R.).
117. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, 58 (James Madison).
118. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (1964); Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1129–31.
119. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 464–65.
120. Id. at 460–62.
121. See Jeffery W. Ladewig & Mathew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences of and Remedies
for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89, 90–91 (2008) (noting
that uneven state populations, requiring one representative per state, barring districts from crossing state lines,
and the 435-seat cap amplify interstate malapportionment).
122. See Id. at 91 (explaining that any apportionment formula will produce interstate malapportionment
because of other constitutional requirements and unequal population growth).
123. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1148.
124. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91.
125. Id.
126. One person, one vote would not apply if the Constitution imposed the cap, but since the cap is mere
legislation, the constitutional principle of one person, one vote takes precedent over the cap. Ladewig, supra note
10, at 1143–44.
127. See Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91 (explaining how territorially bounded house
districts and uneven state populations amplify the effects of the seat cap on attaining mathematical equality in
House districts).
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Without the cap on House seats, there would be more parity in constituency
sizes.128 Complete equality is not a guarantee if Congress expands the House, but
it would at least bring as much equality as is practicable in district sizes.129 Today’s
interstate malapportionment resulting from the seat cap is incredibly severe
compared to the low degrees of intrastate malapportionment the Court held
unconstitutional.130 The Court has held intrastate malapportionment of under one
percent to be unconstitutional; the same standard should apply to 2010’s interstate
malapportionment of over sixty-five percent.131 Wesberry dictates that interstate
malapportionment resulting from the cap fails “the constitutional standard of equal
representation for equal numbers of people ‘as nearly as practicable.’”132
The disparities in the House reflect disparities in the Electoral College too,
especially considering that a state’s electoral votes are equal to its congressional
delegation.133 For example, Texas has 38 electoral votes and a population of
25,268,000, while Vermont has 3 electoral votes and a population of 630,000.134
A Texas electoral delegate represents 664,000 people and a Vermont electoral
delegate represents 210,000 people; therefore, a Texas delegate represents 3 times
the people of a Vermont delegate.135 As with House districts, this dilemma makes
a Vermont voter have a greater individual impact than a Texas voter.136 Similarly,
Wyoming has 189,000 people per delegate and California has 679,000 people per
delegate, giving a Wyoming voter 3.5 times the Electoral College representation
of a California voter.137
These stark examples are not outliers, the Electoral College allows some voters
to be more impactful than others.138 In comparison to larger states with less
electoral votes relative to population, smaller states with more electoral votes
relative to population are often one-party strongholds and less diverse.139
Therefore, not only is there a disparity in representation and voting power in
presidential elections, there is also a clear demographic inequity in the Electoral

128. Id. at 100; Staley & Sonnad, supra note 17; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
129. Cf. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18 (explaining that mathematical precision in equality of House district
sizes is the goal of the Constitution, even if such precision is impossible); Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at
100.
130. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28; White, 412 U.S. at 785; Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1142.
131. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28; White, 412 U.S. at 785; Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1142.
132. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529–30.
133. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1134.
134.
Andrew Prokop, The Electoral College, Explained, VOX (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/21539173/electoral-college-explained-2020-trump-biden (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Id. (noting in an embedded video link that states with more electoral votes compared to population
like Wyoming, Vermont, Maine, Delaware, and New Hampshire are more homogenous than states with less
electoral votes compared to population like California, Texas, New Jersey, New York, Florida).
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College.140 This situation is far from “equal representation” “as nearly as
practicable”; instead, it ensures outsized influence of small states in government.141
Far from the Montana case’s good-faith standard, the seat cap reduces equality
among large and small states in bad-faith.142
Giving larger states more representatives would be more equitable and provide
parity in representation in both the House and Electoral College.143 Adding more
representatives would make district populations smaller and more equal while also
increasing state electoral votes and reducing the disparate impact of small states
on the Electoral College.144 This solution is also practicable because it only
requires legislation in Congress, and the country has expanded the number of
representatives many times prior to the 1920s.145 Following Wesberry’s holding,
expanding the House is a constitutional necessity to avoid inequity in
representation.146
B. Alternatives to Expanding the House
There are various potential solutions other than adding House seats; however,
these solutions are inadequate, extremely difficult, or problematic.147 Subsection 1
explains why changing the apportionment method is inadequate to provide equal
representation.148 Subsection 2 discusses how decreasing the size of the House
presents significant issues.149 Subsection 3 highlights the problems with allowing
districts to cross state lines to have perfectly equal districts.150

140. Prokop, supra note 134.
141. Cf. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529–30 (upholding the constitutional standard of good-faith, practicable
efforts to promote equal representation in the House).
142. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 463.
143. See Staley & Sonnad, supra note 17 (explaining that adding members to the House of Representatives
would promote proportionality within both the House and the Electoral College).
144. See Id. (discussing how the number of electoral votes each state receives is equal to the number of
people the state sends to Congress so increasing House membership would rebalance the power of states in the
Electoral College); see also Wilson, supra note 1 (calculating that an increase in the number of House seats would
significantly reduce disparities in district equality).
145. See Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1147 (quoting CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED:
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S, at 26 (1990)) (noting that
Congress had changed the size of the House in the first 120 years of the nation from 1790 until 1910).
146. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–9, 18.
147. See Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91, 96–97 (noting that the alternatives to expanding
the House are either infeasible, inadequate, or problematic).
148. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
149. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
150. Infra Subsection IV.B.3.
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1. Changing the Apportionment Method
In the Montana case, the Court held that the Huntington–Hill method was a
valid, good-faith, and practicable solution to fairly apportion House seats among
states.151 That holding precludes the arguments that Huntington–Hill is
unconstitutional and that Congress must use a different method to allocate seats.152
The Court would not overrule its precedent because each method affects different
equality measurements in different degrees, reducing the significance of a
particular method.153
Furthermore, even if Congress changed the apportionment method, it would
hardly impact inequalities in representation.154 While switching apportionment
methods could decrease interstate malapportionment slightly, severe interstate
malapportionment would persist.155 There are five practical alternative methods to
Huntington–Hill, but their changes to seat allocations and district size would be
insignificant and only affect a handful of states.156 Such meager impacts are far
from the comprehensive, equal representation the Constitution demands.157
2. Making the House of Representatives Smaller
Some scholars and politicians have suggested making the House of
Representatives smaller for efficiency and parity in representation.158 Reducing the
size of the House so that Montana is no longer the most under-represented state
would marginally equalize state representation.159 However, making the House
smaller would not make changes substantial enough to meet the demands of the

151. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 463–64.
152. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 463–64 (“What is the better measure of
inequality absolute difference in district size, absolute difference in share of a Representative, or relative
difference in district size or share? Neither mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provides a
conclusive answer.”).
153. Id. at 454–55; Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1144.
154. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1145–46; Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91, 96–97; BALINSKI
& YOUNG, supra note 62, at 157–80 (illustrating the marginal effects of changes in apportionment method by
mapping out differences in seat allocation based on census data from each decennial census).
155. See Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1145–46 (detailing that a switch in methods in 1990 would only make
marginal changes in interstate malapportionment metrics).
156. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 62, at 157–80 (charting the differences in seats per state for each
apportionment from 1790–2000 based on six different apportionment methods. Only a few states would get an
increase or decrease in seats, and those that did usually only lost or gained one seat).
157. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28 (finding very low levels of intrastate district malapportionment
unconstitutional).
158. See Apportionment of Representatives: Hearing on H.R. 130 Before the H. Comm. on the Census,
70th Cong. 32–47 (1928) (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.) (noting that a smaller House might
be more efficient); see also Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1151 (explaining that a House size of 419 could slightly
decrease malapportionment statistics).
159. See Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1150 n.153 (noting that dissolving sixteen House seats could slightly
reduce interstate district malapportionment).
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Constitution.160 With its marginal impacts, this solution merely shifts the burden
of inequality from one group of states to a new group of over- and underrepresented states.161
It is also difficult to shrink the government—representatives want to keep their
jobs and communities would hate losing their current representative to join a larger
district.162 Another practical implication of this solution is the increase in workload
of almost all representatives.163 Each representative would have more people to
represent and more committees to sit on, despite already representing substantially
more constituents than the Founders anticipated.164 As a result, representatives
would over-rely on staff for tasks the representatives could once do themselves,
which likely means more staff.165 More staff would result in more bureaucratic
bloat, salaries, and office space.166 Finally, some tasks require the direct attention
of representatives, like writing letters to constituents.167 This change not only
creates more work for representatives by increasing constituency size, but also is
incongruous with the Founders’ intention that representatives directly understand
local needs.168
3. Allowing Districts to Cross State Lines
Ending the constitutional requirement that House districts may not cross state
lines could make perfectly equal districts.169 Even the Supreme Court has noted
that geographical constraints on districts prevent true equality in representation
among states.170 Under this solution, neighboring under- and over-represented
160. Cf. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727–28 (holding intrastate malapportionment levels of under 1%
unconstitutional); see Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1151 (noting that a House size of 419 would still have a
malapportionment level of 63.26%).
161. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1150 n.153, 1151.
162. See, e.g., Apportionment of Representatives: Hearing on H.R. 130 Before the H. Comm. on the
Census, 70th Cong. 32–47 (1928) (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.) (featuring comments from
the members of the Committee on the Census about the increased constituent case workload and the unpopularity
among members of losing their seats) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 130].
163. Hearing on H.R. 130, supra note 162 (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.).
164. Hearing on H.R. 130, supra note 162 (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.); The
Federalist Society, supra note 15.
165. Hearing on H.R. 130, supra note 162 (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.).
166. Hearing on H.R. 130, supra note 162 (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.);
Apportionment of Representatives in Congress Amongst the Several States: Hearing on H.R. 13471 Before the H.
Comm. on the Census, 69th Cong. 124–25 (1927) (statement of Hon. Elbert S. Brigham, Rep. from Vt., H.R.).
167. Apportionment of Representatives: Hearing on H.R. 130 Before the H. Comm. on the Census, 70th
Cong. 32–47 (1928) (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.).
168. Hearing on H.R. 130, supra note 162 (statement of Hon. Joe Crail, Rep. from Cal., H.R.); Hearing
on H.R. 13471, supra note 114, at 124–25 (statement of Hon. Elbert S. Brigham, Rep. from Vt., H.R.).
169. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91, 96–97.
170. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 463.
“The constitutional guarantee of a minimum of one Representative for each State inexorably compels
a significant departure from the ideal. In Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming, where the statewide districts
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states could share districts.171 According to 2010 estimates, this solution would
ensure perfectly equal districts except for one district with a 218-person difference
from the national district average.172
While this solution would create districts of equal sizes, it presents an issue
regarding proper representation of constituents.173 Assume part of a district is in
Montana—a state with legalized cannabis—and the other part is in Idaho—where
cannabis is illegal for all uses.174 The representative in that district would face a
conflict on which states’ interest to represent in Congress if there was a federal bill
on decriminalizing or legalizing cannabis.175 Additionally, each state has different
election laws—such as campaign finance requirements—presenting uncertainty as
to which laws would apply in a district that crosses state lines.176 This solution is
also impractical given the difficulty in changing the Constitution.177 A
constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate
and then three-quarters of state legislatures must ratify the proposed amendment.178
Given political polarization, it would be imprudent to advocate for this politically
infeasible solution.179

are less populous than the ideal district, every vote is more valuable than the national average.
Moreover, the need to allocate a fixed number of indivisible Representatives among 50 States of
varying populations makes it virtually impossible to have the same size district in any pair of States,
let alone in all 50. Accordingly, although ‘common sense’ supports a test requiring ‘a good faith effort
to achieve precise mathematical equality’ within each State, the constraints imposed by Article I, 2,
itself make that goal illusory for the Nation as a whole.”
Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S at 530–31).
171. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91.
172. Id.
173. But see Asher Schechter, Study: Politicians Vote Against the Will of Their Constituents 35 Percent of
the Time, PROMARKET (June 16, 2017), https://promarket.org/2017/06/16/study-politicians-vote-willconstituents-35-percent-time/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that politicians
frequently do not vote on legislation in their constituents’ interests).
174. Jiachuan Wu & Daniella Silva, MAP: See the States Where Marijuana Is Legal, NBC NEWS (updated
Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/map-see-if-marijuana-legal-your-state-n938426 (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
175. Alexandra Hutzler, Bill to Federally Decriminalize Marijuana, Expunge Records Reintroduced in
Congress, NEWSWEEK (May 28, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/bill-to-federallydecriminalize-marijuana-expunge-records-reintroduced-in-congress/ar-AAKuxfK (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
176. See generally KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES (2019) (“The administration of elections in the United
States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather
than a single, unified national system.”).
177. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 95.
178. U.S. CONST., art. V.
179. See Michael Dimock & Richard Wike, America Is Exceptional in the Nature of Its Political Divide,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-inthe-nature-of-its-political-divide/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Americans have rarely
been as polarized as they are today.”).
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V. SOLUTIONS TO EXPAND THE HOUSE
The seat cap is incompatible with equal representation, but a second automatic
formula for adding House seats that works in tandem with Huntington–Hill is a
practicable solution.180 Wesberry and its progeny are clear that the Constitution
demands equal representation, and a cap on seats is antithetical to ensuring equal
representation.181 Establishing an automatic method to increase the number of
House seats after each census and then apportioning those seats according to
Huntington–Hill would represent a proper solution.182 Scholars advance two main
formulas to add seats: the Wyoming Rule and the Cube Root Rule.183 Section A
discusses the mechanics and merits of the Wyoming Rule.184 Section B explains
the Cube Root Rule.185
A. The Wyoming Rule
Applying Reynolds on a nationwide scale, the Wyoming Rule first requires the
Census Bureau to take the national population and divide by the smallest state’s
population.186 The result of that equation is rounded to the nearest whole number
to get the number of House seats for that decade.187 The average district size is the
population of the smallest state.188 Wyoming is the lowest population state, but
projections indicate Vermont will be the smallest by 2040.189 This method is easy
to explain, makes fewer states have only one representative, and prevents
substantial under-representation of larger states.190
This method would initially make a small addition of 113 House seats, but
over time would add more seats than the Cube Root Rule by 2040.191 By making
each district roughly the same population as the smallest population state, this
method creates less disparities in nationwide constituency size.192 However, this
trait exposes a significant downside: the Wyoming Rule guarantees the smallest
state only one representative.193 Like small states at the Constitutional Convention,
180. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 17–18.
181. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529–30 (explaining that the Constitution ensures equal representation in
House districts to the extent it is practicable).
182. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 17–18.
183. Greenburg, supra note 1.
184. Infra Section V.A.
185. Infra Section V.B.
186. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 14–15.
191. Id. at 13–14 (noting that by 2040 the House would have 630 seats under the Wyoming Rule and 623
seats under the Cube Root Rule).
192. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
193. Id. at 14–15.
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small states that miss the cutoff between one and two representatives will oppose
this rule.194 Additionally, each state will not have a population that is an exact
multiple of the smallest state’s population, causing variances in district sizes.195
Scholars criticize the Wyoming Rule as arbitrary because the smallest state’s
population is not consistent or an optimal district size.196 In theory, the Wyoming
Rule’s inconsistencies could destabilize Congress by having massive fluctuations
in the size of Congress and state delegations because of substantial changes in state
populations.197
B. The Cube Root Rule
Most national legislatures conform to the Cube Root Rule to ensure a proper
balance between constituent communications and legislative efficiency.198 The
Cube Root Rule is more complex than the Wyoming Rule, requiring that either all
of Congress or just the House equal the cube root of national population.199 There
is a split in the literature on whether to include the Senate in the calculation or only
ensure the House approximates the cube root of national population.200 Most
advocates in the United States include the Senate in the cube root calculation.201
Under this paradigm, the size of the House is equal to the cube root of national
population minus the number of senators.202
Expanded legislatures risk difficulties in collaboration, but the Cube Root rule
would slow the House’s growth rate after the first expansion.203 The Cube Root
Rule would initially add 141 House seats, but each subsequent apportionment
would add an average of 15 seats per decade for the next few decades.204
194. OFF. OF THE HOUSE HISTORIAN, supra note 23.
195. See KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 15 (noting that differences in state population sizes will make the
Wyoming Rule likely to produce wide variances in constituency sizes due to the new average district size being
unable to perfectly divide into state populations).
196. Id. at 15.
197. See id. (“Because of the Wyoming Rule’s arbitrariness, the number of House seats is not guaranteed
to move in one direction, or at a measured rate. The size of the nation’s smallest state can vary dramatically,
significantly altering the size of the House. . . . The possibility of drastic changes in state population highlights
the extent to which the Wyoming Rule could become unworkable.”).
198. Id. at 11–13.
199. Id. at 13.
200. Including the Senate in the calculation would not change the size of the Senate but make the size of
the House dependent on the cube root of national population minus the number of senators. Not including the
Senate would make the size of the House—rather than the entire Congress—equal to the cube root of national
population. Id.
201. Advocates for including the Senate in the calculation of the size of the House believe that the Senate
is a more significant deliberative body than small chambers of other nations. This claim justifies subtracting the
number of Senate seats from the cube root of national population and reduces the size of the House compared to
using the cube root on its own. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 13; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
202. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
203. Id.
204. See id. (calculating that after the first expansion of 141 seats, the formula adds 17 seats in the
subsequent decade, 17 more seats in the second decade, and 13 seats in the third decade).
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One downside of the Cube Root Rule is that many of its benefits reduce over
time as constituent size grows and seat growth slows.205 In particular,
representatives would become less responsive and representative of their districts
over time.206 Additionally, districts would slowly become less proportional and the
anti-corruption effects would decline after a few decades.207
On balance, the Cube Root Rule is the superior solution to expand the House,
satisfy the Constitution, and promote key policy benefits.208 In harmony with the
Constitution, the Cube Root Rule’s congressional apportionment scheme uses the
national population and can account for increases or decreases in population.209
The Cube Root Rule also ensures more consistent district sizes than the Wyoming
Rule, meeting the Constitution’s demand that districts be as equal as practicable.210
Studies show the Cube Root Rule optimizes both constituents per representative
and the most efficient number of representatives in the chamber for
communication.211 Furthermore, smaller districts will allow more constituents to
interact with their representatives.212
Although the Cube Root Rule has an initial rapid expansion, it eventually
slows to expand in a consistent and measured way.213 While small population states
will dislike a larger House because it may dilute their power, the Cube Root Rule
would grant most states more seats.214 Unlike the Wyoming Rule, the Cube Root
Rule can provide more than one representative to the smallest states.215
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED HOUSE
Expanding the House to equalize constituency sizes would have significant
policy implications.216 Section A addresses concerns about adding more
representatives.217 Section B touches on the direct benefits of an expanded
House.218

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 9, 13 (noting that a larger House makes politicians more familiar with the issues in their
districts due to having a smaller constituency, which limits special interest influence, but that these effects may
dissipate over time as district population grows).
208. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 17.
209. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566–67; KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 17.
210. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566–67; KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 13–15.
211. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 98.
212. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 17.
213. Id. at 13, 18.
214. Greenburg, supra note 1.
215. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 13–15.
216. Id. at 8–10; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
217. Infra Section VI.A.
218. Infra Section VI.B.
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A. Criticism of an Expanded House
Ending the seat cap raises concerns about costs, space, and inefficiency.219 The
biggest financial concern about expanding the House is that more representatives
means more staff and representatives to pay.220 Under either the Wyoming or Cube
Root Rules, the House automatically expands after every census, putting some
expansion critics on guard about increasing budget costs.221 However, some
scholars believe a larger legislature could reduce federal costs.222 Additionally, the
costs are miniscule compared to other areas of federal spending.223 The U.S. budget
is in the trillions of dollars; a decennial increase in the tens of millions is
insignificant and easy to cover with economic reform.224 Congressional salaries
and office budgets—$1,000,000 per representative each year—are a small portion
of the federal budget.225 Congress can allocate funds from other sources to fulfill
the constitutional requirement of equal representation.226
While federal spending would increase rapidly in Congress’ first permanent,
corrective expansion in over 100 years, subsequent expansions would be marginal
and have limited effects on spending.227 The spending argument comes down to a
value judgment, but the values of equal representation are within the
219. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
220. Editorial Board, supra note 4.
221. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 13–15, 17 ; see, e.g., Morris Silverman, Better Yet, Reduce the Size of
the House, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/14/opinion/l-better-yet-reduce-thesize-of-the-house-633391.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that it would cost
“millions of dollars more in salaries, as well as for more office staffs, office space, postage, and printing”).
222. See, e.g., Larry Sabato, Expand the House of Representatives, DEMOCRACY J. MAG. (2008)
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/8/expand-the-house-of-representatives/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“Staff resources could be held constant, more or less, with costs divided by 1,000 instead
of 435.”).
223. See Spending, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (last visited Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.pgpf.org/findingsolutions/understanding-the-budget/spending (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that
defense made up half of the federal discretionary spending in 2019).
224. See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, FY 2019 Federal Budget: Trump’s Budget Request, BALANCE (updated
January 18, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/fy-2019-federal-budget-summary-of-revenue-and-spending4589082 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that the federal government spent about
$4.45 trillion in fiscal year 2019); cf. Taxes, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (last visited June 6, 2021),
https://www.pgpf.org/finding-solutions/tax-reform (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that tax reform could help reduce deficit spending); see also National Security, PETER G. PETERSON
FOUND. (last visited June 6, 2021), https://www.pgpf.org/finding-solutions/national-security (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing defense spending reform “to address America’s long-term fiscal
challenges”).
225. IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30064, SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES: IN BRIEF 6 (2019);
IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40962, MEMBERS REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCE: HISTORY AND
USAGE (2020).
226. Editorial Board, supra note 4 (“Salaries for [additional] lawmakers and their staffs would total less
than one million dollars per representative—which means a couple hundred representatives could be added for
the price of, say, five F-14 fighter jets.”).
227.
KANE
ET
AL.,
supra
note
6,
at
13–14
(2020),
https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/14402/Why the House Must Be Expanded Democracy
Clinic.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Constitution.228 Ignoring those values because it is inconvenient or more expensive
directly ignores the Constitution’s command of fair, equal, and adequate
representation.229 Americans’ distrust of politicians may stem from structural and
institutional inadequacies of Congress: a more representative Congress might
increase approval and make better policy.230 Perhaps the benefits will far outweigh
the costs.231
Concerns about space are distractions: the House chamber is perfectly capable
of seating more people as demonstrated at the annual State of the Union Address.232
Claims that the House will have to meet in stadiums or require Star Wars Galactic
Senate hover platforms to fit all the representatives are hyperbolic and
disingenuous.233 The number of seats added under either expansion method would
be under 200, even after three decades.234 Even if the House was unable to fit the
representatives, Congress could build more office space or expand the Capitol.235
This concern is fanciful given the reality that most actions in the House do not take
place with every representative present.236 Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic
revealed how easy technology has made remote work and communication.237
During the pandemic, Congress and legislatures across the country used video
conferencing platforms for hearings and floor votes.238 If space ever became an
issue, technology presents reasonable alternatives.239

228. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
229. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
230. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; Sabato, supra note 222
(“The American public’s cynicism toward Congress cannot be diluted by tinkering around the margins. . . . But
it’s no longer enough to throw out the incumbents–we first need to add more members to their ranks.”).
231. See Wilma Rule, Expanded Congress Would Help Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/24/opinion/l-expanded-congress-would-help-women-175991.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that the costs of expanding the House are small when
compared with the benefit of a legislature that is closer to its constituents).
232. See KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10 (noting that all Representatives, Senators, Cabinet secretaries,
Supreme Court justices, chief military officers gather on the House floor to hear the President’s State of the Union
Address).
233. See id. (“Some may argue that the Capitol building cannot accommodate more members of
Congress.”).
234. Id at 13–14.
235. Id. at 10.
236. See Charles A. Kromkowski & John A. Kromkowski, Why 435? A Question of Political Arithmetic,
24 POLITY 129, 142, 144 (1991) (noting that most deliberation and negotiation in the House happens in committee
hearings or behind closed doors, and that representatives often give speeches on the House floor in front of an
empty chamber).
237. Coronavirus: How the World of Work May Change Forever, BBC (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20201023-coronavirus-how-will-the-pandemic-change-the-way-we-work
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
238. See, e.g., Tony Romm et al., Facebook, Google, Twitter CEOs Clash with Congress in Pre-election
Showdown, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/28/twitterfacebook-google-senate-hearing-live-updates/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
239. Id.
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Critics’ claims of inefficiency are similarly unfounded because a larger body
does not ensure less productivity.240 In fact, the Senate is a smaller body, yet often
takes longer to pass legislation.241 What causes gridlock is not the number of
members in a chamber but divided government, different partisan composition and
policy views between chambers, and the Senate filibuster.242 Expanding the House
could actually decrease gridlock by splitting gerrymandered districts and making
more seats competitive.243 More competitive seats may produce more centrists in
Congress and incentivize compromise.244 Votes may take longer but
representatives will have less committee work and more time for constituents,
learning the issues, and developing expertise.245
B. Benefits of an Expanded House
Expanding the House has significant benefits that far outweigh critics’
concerns.246 First and foremost, an expanded House creates a more responsive and
egalitarian legislative body.247 More representatives means more districts,
shrinking the average district size and making constituent communications much
easier.248 Currently, candidates must reach out to a greater number of voters to get
elected in larger districts—a costly endeavor.249 Candidates must make deals with
interest groups to pay for campaign costs, sacrificing the views of other groups and
constituents in the process.250 The Founders feared a rise in corrupt politicians if
the House were too small and representatives were unfamiliar with voters’
needs.251 Expanding the House will make districts smaller, shield against special
interest influence, and require representatives to uphold their constituents’
preferences.252

240. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
241. See, e.g., Apportionment of Representatives in Congress Amongst the Several States: Hearing on H.R.
13471 Before the H. Comm. on the Census, 69th Cong. 133–35 (1927) (statement of Hon. James G. Strong, Rep.
from Kan., H.R.) (“I think the House of Representatives, large as it is, functions a lot better than the Senate. We
have more business than the Senate; yet we are always ahead of the Senate with legislation.”); see Sarah A.
Binder, Going Nowhere: A Gridlocked Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 1, 2000),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/going-nowhere-a-gridlocked-congress/ on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (explaining the sources of gridlock and noting that Senate rules make it inefficient).
242. Binder, supra note 241.
243. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
244. Binder, supra note 241.
245. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
246. Id. at 8–10.
247. Id. at 8.
248. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, 58 (James Madison) (highlighting the need for representatives to
represent a manageable number of people to understand and respond to the needs of their constituents).
249. Wilson, supra note 1.
250. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
251. Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We’ve Outgrown? An Argument for
Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 175–79 (1992).
252. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 8, 9.
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These anti-corruption effects would make elections more competitive.253
Lowering campaign costs by making smaller districts—many initially without
incumbents—could launch the candidacies of ordinary citizens that currently
decline to run due to costs.254 This effect could help seat more women and
minorities in Congress—and could make it easier for third-party and independent
candidates to win elections—better reflecting America’s diversity.255 Breaking the
two-party mold could break partisan control by encouraging coalition
government.256
Increasing the number of representatives would provide more Electoral
College parity between large and small states.257 However, an expanded House
would not have changed the result of most past Presidential elections, nor would it
ensure the popular vote winner would win the Electoral College.258 Therefore, this
issue is not partisan, it is about ensuring equality in representation.259
After January 6, 2021, it is difficult to deny the modern decline of American
democratic institutions.260 If other indicia of a constitutional crisis were
insufficient to show this decline, surely the President stoking a violent mob on
Congress to remain in power is enough.261 Moreover, polarization prevented
Congress from holding him accountable, despite the Constitution describing its
required procedure.262 This decline makes expanding the House more pressing;

253. Editorial Board, supra note 4.
254. See John A. Kromkowski, Framers Would Approve of a Larger House, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/30/opinion/l-framers-would-approve-of-a-larger-house-839491.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[More] persons per district dilute[s] the political power of groups
in urban areas and contribute to spiraling campaign costs, effectively cutting off the electoral process from a wide
range of potential candidates.”).
255. See KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 9 (“Smaller districts allow independent and third-party candidates
to run issue-driven campaigns . . . . They also make it easier for candidates to reach the critical number of voters
needed to win a seat. Finally, more seats in the House diminishes the significance of any single seat in determining
a congressional majority.”); St. John Yates, supra note 251, at 193; Editorial Board, supra note 4.
256. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
257. Id.; Staley & Sonnad, supra note 17.
258. Staley & Sonnad, supra note 17.
259. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; The Federalist Society, supra note 15.
260.
See Timothy Snyder, The American Abyss, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021),
nytimes.com/2021/01/09/magazine/trump-coup.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(analyzing America’s democratic backsliding and descent into pre-fascism).
261. Ladewig, supra note 10, at 1143; Snyder, supra note 260; see Christina Pazzanese, Where are We
Now
After
a
Second
Impeachment?,
HARV.
GAZETTE
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/01/american-democracy-could-be-at-inflection-point-say-experts/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Capitol Riot may either “reinvigorat[e]
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262. See Julia Azari & Seth Masket, The 4 Types of Constitutional Crises, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 9,
2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/constitutional-crisis/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
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repairing America’s only federal majoritarian institution could accelerate the
restoration and reaffirmation of other democratic norms and institutions.263 Fixing
the House could make individual’s votes more impactful, encourage voting, and
reduce the power of extremists.264 A diverse House would likely pass much-needed
democratic reforms.265 These reforms would promote a healthy democracy by
empowering citizens and strengthening institutions.266 Without reforms, American
democracy will continue to unravel.267 Expanding the House could bring it closer
to the average American, inject fresh ideas into Congress, and ensure more
democratic reforms are a priority in the future.268
VII. CONCLUSION
The 435-seat cap creates unconstitutional levels of malapportionment.269 To
be constitutional, the seat cap must produce districts that are as equal “as is
practicable” to ensure “equal representation.”270 However, uneven population
growth, the 435-seat cap, and other limitations produce disparities in district size
that violate the one person, one vote requirement.271
While perfect population distribution among districts is mathematically
impossible, the current scheme ensures districts in small states have more
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University of the Pacific Law Review).
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structural inequalities in voting power are threatening democracy, and how addressing those inequalities can
protect the nation); Pazzanese, supra note 261 (noting that the nation is likely at an inflection point on democracy);
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Before the H. Comm. on the Census, 69th Cong. 121–22 (1927) (statement of Hon. Elbert S. Brigham, Rep. from
Vt., H.R.); Binder, supra note 241.
265. KANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 9; see, e.g., H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021) (requiring several democratic
reforms, including independent redistricting commissions).
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267. See Gilens & Page, supra note 2 (highlighting the influence of the elite on Congress); KANE ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that a large House prevents corruption); Snyder, supra note 260 (discussing how
more politicians will continue to attempt to break American democracy for their own personal gain—perhaps to
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representation than large states.272 Capping the number of seats while population
growth is uneven severely limits equality.273 Increasing the number of House seats
would create more equal district sizes consistent with Wesberry.274 Present
inequalities in district sizes are comparatively more severe than past inequalities
the Court has held unconstitutional.275 Furthermore, the cap also produces
disparities in the Electoral College.276 The end result is that voters in some states
have more power in the House and Electoral College than voters in other states.277
This situation is a far cry from the Constitution’s demand of “equal representation”
of people “as nearly as practicable.”278
Using the Cube Root Rule to expand the House is the best, most practical, and
most adaptable solution.279 The Cube Root Rule’s use of the national population
satisfies the Constitution.280 Additionally, the Cube Root Rule is more consistent
in making district sizes “as equal as practicable.”281 Adding more representatives
makes the ratio of constituents per representative more ideal and egalitarian.282
Similarly, adding representatives increases the electoral votes of larger states,
reducing the disparate impact of small states on the Electoral College.283
This solution only requires Congress to pass a statute repealing the
Apportionment Act of 1929 and replacing it with new legislation to expand the
House.284 The Cube Root Rule would act as a second, separate automatic formula
that adds seats every ten years according to the cube root of the national population
minus the number of Senators.285 Huntington–Hill would then automatically
apportion those additional seats and prior seats proportionately based on respective

272. Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 121, at 90–91.
273. See Id. (explaining how territorially bounded house districts and uneven state populations amplify the
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state populations.286 These automatic formulas would prevent representatives from
engaging in partisan apportionment battles that plagued past apportionments.287
Not only does the Cube Root Rule advance the Constitution’s goals, but it also
promotes key policies that protect against democratic backsliding.288 First, the
Cube Root Rule makes districts smaller, which facilitates communication between
constituents and representatives.289 It also ensures a balance between optimal
constituent size and legislative efficiency.290 In doing so, the Cube Root Rule
prevents special interest capture and lowers the cost to get elected.291 The increase
in membership could bring new, diverse people and viewpoints to Congress, more
adequately representing the people.292 A more representative House could facilitate
much-needed democratic reforms necessary to keep the Republic afloat in
uncertain times.293 While expanding the House is certainly not the cure-all for
America’s declining democracy, it could catalyze other democratic reforms.294
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